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Abstract 
 This study evaluates the foreign direct investment (FDI) location choices made by 
Chinese firms from 1996 to 2015 and investigates the extent to which Chinese firms are 
attracted to investing in countries with high levels of political risk. Using new Chinese 
data, the study categorizes Chinese firms into Central State-Owned Enterprises and Other 
Chinese Firms to see the relationship between investment location and political risk for 
firms with varying levels of Chinese government control. Additionally, the data is 
divided between investments made from 1996 to 2003 and investments made from 1996 
to 2015 to measure the effect that important changes in Chinese domestic policy in 2004 
have had on the investment location choices of these firms. After conducting negative 
binomial regressions, the results show that these two types of Chinese firms have 
different attractions to political risk across different time periods. Central State-Owned 
Enterprises’ FDI location choices are not significantly influenced by a country’s political 
risk regardless of time period, but China’s Other Firms change from being attracted to 
political risk prior to 2004 to being deterred by it after 2004. These findings show that 
changes to Chinese domestic policy and level of control by the Chinese central 
government can have a profound influence on Chinese firms’ views towards political risk, 
and this reflects the larger ability of Chinese government intervention to enact change in 
Chinese firms and in the greater Chinese business environment. 
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Introduction: 
 Over the past 30 years, no developing economy has been given as much attention 
by researchers, businesses, and governments as China. Long-standing economic growth 
has allowed it to rise on the world stage within a very short amount of time and establish 
itself as an economic powerhouse and a powerful political regime. During this rise, 
China’s multinational firms have played an important role in helping facilitate this 
growth, and in particular, there has been a marked rise in outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI) from Chinese firms. From 2003 to 2010, Chinese OFDI grew from 
$2.85 billion USD to $68.81 billion, rising to become 5.2 percent of total global OFDI. 
 
Figure 1: China’s Outward FDI Total, 2003-2010 
 
  
  
 Multinational firms around the world engage in many types of trade that involve 
varying levels of intervention into local markets and contain distinct levels of inherent 
risk, but foreign direct investment (FDI) is an especially high risk, high reward form of 
 Source: 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
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investment for multinational firms. While exporting, licensing, and franchising all allow a 
firm to enter foreign markets without investing in foreign factories or facilities, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) involves a firm directly owning and controlling facilities in a 
foreign country. There are three methods of FDI: building new facilities in a foreign 
country, buying existing assets in that country, or participating in a joint venture. Such 
FDI allows firms to have increased control over its international operations, acquire 
direct knowledge of foreign markets, and avoid tariffs and other barriers to investment 
that would affect goods being imported from overseas (Griffin and Pustay, 2015).  
 However, FDI also exposes a firm to greater economic and political risk. Firms 
engaging in FDI must meet the challenges of “operating, managing, and financing their 
foreign subsidiaries in a political, legal and cultural milieu different from their own” 
(Griffin and Pustay, 2015), and many countries restrict foreign FDI through direct 
controls on capital or banning intervention from foreign companies (Griffin and Pustay, 
2015). Additionally, should the foreign country’s exchange rates change adversely, the 
value of the firm’s investments could deteriorate quickly (Chou, 2000). Firms engaging 
in FDI raise their profit capabilities but also open themselves to greater financial and 
political risk. 
 This study analyzes the relationship between Chinese OFDI in foreign countries 
and the political risk in those countries. Chinese OFDI stands out among that of other 
countries around the world for several reasons. Not only has the amount of Chinese OFDI 
risen at an unprecedented speed over the past twenty years as indicated in Figure 1, but 
the countries where Chinese firms have been investing in also do not often fit the 
standard profile for attractive FDI locations. Standard FDI theory states that countries 
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with large market sizes, stable political environments, and high economic growth 
strongly attract FDI (Chakrabarti, 2001); however, the regions where the bulk of China’s 
OFDI has recently flown to are not generally characterized by these trends. Table 1 
depicts the destinations of Chinese OFDI from 2003 to 2008, and it shows that over this 
period on average 91.87 percent of Chinese OFDI flowed into Asia, Latin America, and 
Africa instead of generally more economically developed and politically stable regions 
such as Europe and North America.  
 
Table 1: Destinations of Chinese OFDI by Region, 2003-2008 
Year	 Destination	of	OFDI	flow	(%)	
	
Asia	 Latin	
America	
Africa	 Europe	 North	
America	
Oceania	
2003 52.5 36.5 2.6 5.3 2.0 1.1 
2004 54.6 32 5.8 3.1 2.3 2.2 
2005 35.6 52.6 3.3 4.2 2.6 1.7 
2006 43.5 48.0 2.9 3.4 1.5 0.7 
2007 62.6 18.5 5.9 5.8 4.3 2.9 
2008 77.9 6.6 9.8 1.6 0.6 3.5 
Average 54.44 32.37 5.06 3.9 2.21 2.02 
 
  
 This highlights the uniqueness of Chinese OFDI and poses interesting questions as 
to why Chinese firms are choosing to invest in countries and areas with seemingly higher 
political risk. One would assume that a country with high political risk would not give 
investors an incentive to invest due to a higher risk on their investments; however, 
credible studies support this observation that political risk does not affect Chinese firms 
in the conventional way, and some studies even claim that Chinese OFDI is attracted to 
political risk (Buckley et al., 2007; Kolstad and Wiig, 2010; Quer et al., 2012).  
 Source: Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 2003-2008 
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 This study plans to have four contributions to the empirical literature. First, it 
contributes new data to analyze Chinese OFDI’s seeming indifference to host country 
political risk. Due to scarcity of data on Chinese firms and the relatively short period 
since China’s boom in investment began, this new data could be valuable in helping build 
on the results of past literature. Second, it tests the effect that changes in domestic 
Chinese policy in 2004 have had on the determinants of Chinese OFDI. Finally, it 
analyzes the effect that political risk has on Chinese OFDI for both Chinese firms 
controlled by the central government and those not controlled by the central government.  
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Previous Literature: 
Previous Literature on Chinese OFDI: 
 Much of the empirical literature already conducted on host-country determinants of 
Chinese OFDI has adopted a typology provided by Dunning (1977) which classifies 
OFDI according to four investment motivations: market-seeking investment looking to 
enter new markets; resource-seeking investment in search for natural resources; strategic 
asset-seeking investment to enhance the firm’s intellectual property; and efficiency-
seeking investments to reduce overall costs (Dunning, 1977). Those studies have shown 
evidence supporting that the first three of Dunning’s investment motivations are 
significant in determining OFDI patterns of Chinese firms, and they have shown that 
China’s OFDI stands out from those of most other countries (Buckley et al., 2007; 
Kolstad and Wiig, 2010).  
 Among these investment motivations, natural resources have been shown to be an 
especially significant determinant of Chinese OFDI, and the interaction between host 
country political risk and natural resource endowment has also been found to be 
significant (Buckley et al., 2007; Cui & Jiang, 2009; Kolstad and Wiig, 2009; Ramasamy 
et al., 2012). Host country market size and distance are two factors that are widely 
recognized in economic literature to influence the flow of FDI received by a country 
(Chakrabarti, 2001; Mascarenhas, 1992), and this has also been found to be a significant 
determinant of Chinese OFDI (Buckley et al., 2007).  
 Other studies have also analyzed the effect that a Chinese firm’s specific industry 
has on the determinants of China’s OFDI. They have concluded that Dunning’s 
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investment motivations have different degrees of prevalence in different Chinese 
industries such as manufacturing, service and primary services (De Beule and Duanmu, 
2012; Amighini, 2013). Chinese firms also display different investment behaviors 
between developed and developing countries (Cheung and Qian, 2009), and the large role 
that the Chinese government plays in China’s multinational corporations has been studied 
and shown that the determinants of OFDI for state-owned firms often differ from those of 
privately-owned ones (Ramasamy et al., 2012). 
 
Defining Political Risk:  
 Another important influence on the investment behaviors of Chinese firms is the 
level of political risk in each country. Political risk is considered to be “any changes in a 
country’s political environment that may adversely affect the value of a firm’s business 
activities.” (Griffin and Pustay, 2015). This broad definition can encompass 
macropolitical risk that affects all firms in a country or micropolitical risk that only 
affects specific firms. Civil wars, for example, cause the destruction of property, 
disruption of production, and loss of sales for almost all firms in a country whereas 
tightened regulations on a country’s manufacturing industry will only directly affect 
those firms investing in that industry.  
 To multinational firms engaging in FDI, political risk can greatly alter the 
environment in which a firm operates. For example, minimum wage laws affect the price 
a firm must pay for labor and environmental protection laws affect the technology a firm 
can use. Moreover, the extent to which a country adheres to these laws or can restrict 
unlawful business practices can also have a profound impact on the way a firm operates. 
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In this way, the decision for a firm to invest in one country over another can be heavily 
dependent on the strength of that country’s political institutions and the perceived level of 
political risk. 
 With so many factors that contribute to a country’s overall political risk, it is 
difficult to accurately quantify political risk. Each country has different laws and 
regulations, levels of corruption, political backgrounds, etc. that create a unique political 
environment for every country. However, many previous studies which analyze political 
risk use the quality of a country’s political institutions as a proxy for level of political risk. 
A country’s political institutions consist of the organizations which create and enforce 
laws and regulations. Like a referee in a sports match, these institutions “establish the 
rules of the game that structure interactions, and organizations are the players limited by 
these rules, which can be both formal—laws and regulations—and informal—customs, 
traditions, or codes of conduct.” (North, 1990).  
 Previous studies have represented quality of political institutions and level of 
political risk with data from the World Bank’s Governance Indicators (Ramasamy et al., 
2012). These consist of six broad measures of host country political risk: Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. This study 
also utilizes these indicators to represent political risk, and the details regarding the 
specific implementation of these indicators in the model can be found in the Data and 
Model section.  
 When political institutions necessary for well-functioning markets are not well 
structured or enforced, this increases the cost of doing business in that country (Blongien, 
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2005). Additionally, the uncertainty and inherent risk associated with owning and 
operating a foreign subsidiary can also deter firms from engaging in FDI (Brouthers, 
2002; Pak and Park, 2004). Therefore, it generally understood that increased political risk 
diminishes FDI activity (Chakrabarti, 2001). This study specifically analyzes the 
relationship between political risk such as this and the location of Chinese OFDI. 
 
Influence of Political Risk on Chinese OFDI:  
 Some analyses on the determinants of Chinese OFDI support this conventional 
wisdom that as a country’s political risk increases Chinese OFDI into that country 
decreases. For the case of Chinese firms, Duanmu and Guney (2009) found that Chinese 
FDI is attracted to countries with good political environments and especially those with 
open economic regimes (Duanmu and Guney, 2009).  
 However, many other studies have shown that political risk does not affect Chinese 
firms in a conventional way, often being attracted to political risk rather than deterred by 
it (Buckley et al., 2007; Ramasamy et al., 2012; Quer et al., 2012). Researchers claim that 
since other multinational firms from developed countries have already invested heavily 
abroad in the past, Chinese multinational firms are, “latecomers on the world stage.” 
(Mathews, 2006). This combined with China’s rapid economic growth has led its firms to 
seemingly skip certain stages of the internationalization process (Luo and Tung, 2007). 
This has caused Chinese firms to lack ownership advantages in these skipped stages such 
as access to natural resources and engage in OFDI in order to, “augment the ownership 
advantages that they lack.” (Ramasamy, et al., 2012). They claim that the desire to 
augment such ownership advantages is so strong that they are “willing to adopt 
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aggressive, high risk [OFDI] targets.” (e.g. Sudan, Dem. Rep. of the Congo, etc.) 
(Ramasamy et al., 2012). Others also propose that China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
could utilize their advantages in the Chinese domestic market to get greater access to 
funds and allow them to invest in riskier locations (Buckley et al., 2007). Chinese 
multinational firms exist in a market with very unique features that could create an 
environment where Chinese firms contradict conventional wisdom and are attracted 
OFDI in high political risk countries.  
 
China’s “Go Global” Strategy: 
In order to fully understand the political and economic environment surrounding 
Chinese multinational firms, the liberalization of China’s OFDI policy needs to be taken 
into account. The process of China’s OFDI policy liberalization can be traced through 
China’s “走出去” or “Go Global” strategy, which was formally instigated in 1999 
(Buckley et al., 2007; Luo et al., 2009). This initiative aims to encourage Chinese firms to 
engage in OFDI by reducing obstacles to international investment (Sauvant, 2005). 
The true foundation of this “Go Global” ideology and strategy began with the 
institution of Deng Xiaoping as China’s leader in the late 1970’s and the subsequent 
Chinese economic reform (改革开放) of the 1980’s. Deng believed that ensuring China’s 
long-term success depended on a balance between maintaining centralized control of the 
country by the socialist central government and liberalizing trade relations with other 
countries. Deng stated that, “if China does not uphold socialism and does not uphold 
economic reform, then it can only go down the road to disaster.” (Deng Xiaoping, 1992) 
(不 持社会主 ，不 持改革开放，只能是死路一条). He pioneered the Chinese ideals of 
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foreign trade and investing in other countries, and in pursuing this road to success, he 
began the Chinese economic reform in the 1980’s which slowly began increasing China’s 
trade with other countries. 
While Deng gave birth to China’s “Go Global” ideology, it was not actually 
implemented as a government strategy until the 1990’s under the leadership of China’s 
next president Jiang Zemin. He set into motion two policies with regards to Chinese FDI, 
the “引 来” or “Bring Inward” and “走出去” or “Go Global” strategies. These policies 
were meant to both encourage foreign FDI into China and encourage OFDI from China to 
other countries. At the Chinese National Conference of Foreign Investment in 1997, Jiang 
emphasized these policies saying that “China does not only need to attract foreign 
companies’ investments to China, but it also must lead and organize powerful domestic 
companies to invest abroad.” (我 不 要 极吸引外国企 到中国来投  厂，也要 极引
 和  国内有 力的企 走出去). These government goals aided in bringing foreign 
investment into China and posed outward FDI as important to China’s future growth.  
 Finally, China’s “Go Global” strategy truly took flight in 2004 when it went from 
being a government goal to a nationally implemented policy. During this time, the “Bring 
Inward” and “Go Global” policy strategies became important parts of a larger 
liberalization of China’s laws pertaining to OFDI. Following the Sixteenth Communist 
Party Congress in October 2003, the Chinese government published a report called 
“Decision of the Communist Party of China on Issues Concerning the Improvement of 
the Socialist Economic System.” In this report, it was detailed that, “the ‘Go Global’ 
strategy will be implemented to improve outward investment, to give Chinese firms more 
power to make their own management decisions…and promote the development of all 
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Chinese firms.” (Central Government of China, 2003). This report signals an important 
turning point in the Chinese government’s support for outward investment and helped 
promote huge surges in Chinese OFDI in the years following 2004.  
 Figure 2 reflects this surge of Chinese outward investment following the 
implementation of the “Go Global” strategy, showing how the total number of OFDI 
projects begun by Chinese firms went from only several hundred in 2003 to over 1000 in 
2005 and eventually rising to over 10,000 in 2015.  
 
Figure 2: Total Number of OFDI Projects by Chinese Firms, 1996-2015 
 
The success of the “Go Global” strategy in increasing the amount of China’s 
investments abroad can largely be attributed to how this strategy made engaging in 
international investments easier for Chinese firms. Through this strategy, the Chinese 
government transformed from a regime that directly intervenes in OFDI decisions and 
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commands business outcomes to a state that directs the market through a wide set of 
administrative bodies (Bach, Newman, and Weber, 2006). In doing so, OFDI approval 
processes were simplified, an information bank was established to provide guidance for 
firms’ overseas investments, and the institution of firm annual reports allowed for the 
government to better monitor obstacles to companies engaging in OFDI (Luo et al., 2009).  
These changes to China’s OFDI process increased the relative ease for firms to 
independently engage in OFDI. While firms currently need to report and confirm their 
investments with the central government, their investment decisions are no longer as tied 
to national economic imperatives set by the central government that might have 
previously pushed firms to engage in investments that were risky and not profit-
maximizing (Buckley et al., 2007). Also, the “Go Global” and “Bring Inward” strategies 
increased the ability for firms to make more informed, profit-maximizing decisions on 
their investments. In addition to the greater resources provided by the Chinese 
government for providing investment guidance, firms have greater access to foreign 
companies that can also provide investment advisory services. The development and 
implementation of China’s “Go Global” strategy greatly changed China’s business 
environment by making it easier for domestic firms to make investments abroad. 
 
Increased Chinese Firm Privatization: 
	 Just as China’s domestic OFDI policy has gradually changed and influenced 
Chinese firms’ business environment, the types of firms that exist in China have also 
greatly changed and have adapted the way that Chinese firms invest abroad. 
 Following China’s Cultural Revolution in the late 1970’s, the vast majority of 
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Chinese firms were wholly owned by the Chinese central government, and China’s 
private sector was insignificant in comparison. In fact, the share of private sector 
employment out of China’s total national employment in 1981 was less than 2 percent 
(World Bank, 2000). Additionally, after OFDI was formally permitted during the 1980’s 
economic reform, “the internationalization of Chinese firms was still tightly controlled by 
the Chinese national and provincial governments, either directly, by fiat, or indirectly via 
economic policy.” (Buckley et al., 2007). The clear dominance of state-owned enterprises 
in China’s domestic and international markets alludes to the fact that any OFDI 
conducted during the 1980’s was likely conducted by state-owned enterprises or given 
official endorsement by the Chinese central government.  
 However, in recent years the Chinese government’s administrative controls have 
been relaxed. Up until the early 1990’s China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were 
wholly owned by the central Chinese government; however, in 1995 China adopted the 
“grasp the large and let go of the small” SOE reform policy (Ralston, 2006). This policy 
allowed for some of China’s small, local SOE’s to be sold to private individuals, 
beginning the process of firm privatization. Subsequently, in 1999, “private ownership 
and the rule of law were incorporated into the Chinese constitution.” (Ralston, 2006). As 
laws against privatization of firms were slowly liberalized, China’s private sector began 
growing at an incredible rate. Between 1991 and 1997, the number of Chinese private 
firms grew at an annual rate of 46 percent, employment in these firms grew at 41 percent, 
and the value of their output grew at 71 percent (World Bank, 2000). Then, in March 
2004, firms’ “private assets and capital were finally legalized and protected under the 
country’s constitution.” (Ralston, 2006).  
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 Today, China’s private sector has grown to become as integral a part of the Chinese 
economy as the state-owned sector. For example, the share of China’s state enterprises in 
many industries has been reduced significantly to make way for the rise of private firms. 
Figure 3 shows how the share of Chinese state enterprises in gross industrial output has 
fallen from over 75 percent in 1978 to 26 percent in 2011. Similarly, in 1980 state-owned 
firms accounted for around three-quarters of the value of China’s construction sector, but 
by 2010, the share of construction value contributed by the state had fallen to less than 40 
percent, the rest undertaken by private and foreign firms (Lardy, 2014). Along with the 
development of the “Go Outward” strategy, Chinese firm privatization has grown at an 
incredible rate, and the private sector’s contribution to China’s total economic output and 
OFDI has increased significantly. 
 
Figure 3: Gross Industrial Output of Chinese State Enterprises, 1978-2011 
 
Source: Lardy, N. (2014). Markets over Mao: The rise of private business in China.  
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Effects of Financial Crises on Chinese OFDI: 
 Various financial crises which have occurred globally from the 1990’s to present 
day have also had direct and indirect impacts on Chinese OFDI. During the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997, widespread policy changes occurred in China where OFDI 
approval procedures became increasingly strict and each OFDI project was subject to a 
screening and monitoring process (Wong and Chan, 2003). This crisis served as a catalyst 
for OFDI reform during the 1990’s and limited the opportunities for firms engaging in 
OFDI.  
 However, other financial crises around the world have conversely created 
opportunities for Chinese international investment. Following the global financial crisis 
in 2008, with US$ 1.9 trillion in foreign-exchange reserves and a current account surplus, 
Chinese multinationals had the opportunity to cheaply acquire market share and brands in 
the developing world through outward investments (Davies, 2009). Also, this economic 
crisis triggered a “new wave of organizational restructuring for Western companies 
which urgently needed liquid capital to fund their operations.” (Luo et al., 2009). This 
generated more opportunities than before for emerging Chinese multinational firms to 
venture abroad through mergers and acquisitions. The 2008 financial crisis helped enable 
emerging Chinese multinationals to acquire cheap assets in developed countries and 
obtain a foothold in those markets. Global financial crises have promoted the 
development of Chinese OFDI both through direct policy changes and indirect 
cheapening of foreign assets.  
 
New Types of Chinese Firms: 
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With China’s “going global” policy towards international trade, the increasing 
importance of its private sector, and the effects of global financial crises, the entities and 
people who own Chinese companies have become much different than they were several 
decades ago. While in the 1970’s only the central government or extensions of the central 
government could own companies, today Chinese firm ownership structures are much 
more complex. These differences in firm ownership structures are very important to 
account for in properly understanding what influences Chinese OFDI. Previous studies 
have shown that the investment decisions of state-owned firms and private firms are often 
different where private firms are found to be more market-seeking (Ramasamy et al., 
2012). Also, the financial performance of Chinese firms often differs based on ownership 
type (Chen et al., 2009), and firms that are more successful are generally better equipped 
to make international investments. Therefore, who owns and operates a Chinese firm can 
have a significant influence on how that firm engages in OFDI. 
To summarize who owns and controls Chinese companies today, the Chinese 
government currently allows for six types of shares in a listed Chinese company: state, 
legal person, individual, foreign, management, and employee shares (Chen et al., 2009). 
However, the first three types of shares constitute the vast majority and are generally 
controlled by four different types of shareholders: 
1. State asset management bureaus (SAMBs) 
SAMBs are shareholding institutions that belong to the state. They appoint the 
board of directors and managers of the firm, collect the earnings, and transfer 
them directly to the state treasury (Ramasamy et al., 2012). 
2. SOEs affiliated with the central government (Central SOEs) 
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Central SOEs refer to the 157 SOEs controlled directly by the central 
government’s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC). These SOEs belong to and are strictly monitored by the central 
government. 
3. SOEs affiliated with local governments (Local SOEs) 
Local SOEs are SOEs controlled directly by a local provincial or county 
government. These firms constitute the largest group of controlling shareholders 
of listed firms in China (Chen et al., 2009). 
4. Private investors (Private) 
PIs include both private firms and individual shareholders. 
 
 These shareholders constitute the four main ownership types of Chinese firms. 
However, since the OFDI undertaken by firms controlled by the first type of shareholder 
(SAMBs) are mainly affiliated with the firm’s local government (Ramasamy et al., 2012), 
SAMBs can be merged with Local SOEs to create the three main types of firm ownership: 
Central SOE, Local SOE, and Private.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Classification of Chinese Firms in This Study: 
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To account for the potential differences in OFDI trends between these distinct 
types of Chinese companies, this study groups Chinese firms based on the ownership 
structure detailed above and on level of supervision by the central government. Due to 
their direct control by the SASAC, Central SOEs are the most tightly state-controlled 
firms in China. Their chairmen are carefully chosen by the central government and they 
are subject to close monitoring from central government offices such as the Chinese 
National Audit Office (Chen et al., 2009). Therefore, Central SOEs are expected to 
adhere more so to the central government’s plans of acquiring strategic assets and their 
OFDI determinants could be influenced as a result.  
On the other hand, Local SOEs and Private firms do not have such stringent 
monitoring and state control. While Local SOEs are still managed by China’s local 
governments, laws, regulations, and supervision are “more difficult to enforce the further 
away the parties are from China’s center of power,” and Local SOEs are allowed to 
independently make investment decisions, create their own policies, and establish their 
own organizational hierarchies (Chen et al., 2009). Private firms are not subject to such 
direct monitoring by the state; thus, their investment decisions are similarly independent 
and their goals are aimed more towards profit maximization. Due to their relative 
independence from direct central government control, this study combines Local SOEs 
and Private firms into one group labeled “Other Firms” and compares them to Central 
SOEs. 
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Hypotheses: 
Attraction to Political Risk: 
Given the mixed results of previous studies regarding Chinese OFDI and its 
relationship to political risk, this study plans to contribute to the empirical literature by 
testing this relationship as well. Utilizing new data on Chinese OFDI (see page 18), I 
propose that Chinese OFDI is attracted to host country political risk due to the Chinese 
government’s powerful desire to acquire strategic resources which might be located in 
countries with high political risk. 
Hypothesis 1: Chinese OFDI is attracted to host country political risk. 
 
Changes to Chinese Domestic Policy: 
The changes brought by China’s “Go Global” strategy in 2004 allowed for 
Chinese firms to engage in more profit-maximizing and less risky investment decisions, 
and I propose that this will cause Chinese firms to be less attracted to political risk 
following these changes in 2004.  
Hypothesis 2: Chinese firms will be less attracted to political risk after 2004. 
 
Different Chinese Firms Have Different Attractions to Political Risk: 
I argue that China’s changing firm ownership structures and the difference in 
level of state control between Central SOEs and Local SOEs/Private firms could reflect 
different OFDI patterns and different attractions to political risk. I predict that due to 
Central SOEs close monitoring by the central government, they will be attracted to 
political risk across all years of the study in order to conform to the larger national plans 
20	
	
of the Chinese government to acquire natural resources. However, I believe that due to 
the relative independence of Other Firms from central government control, their 
investment will be more profit-maximizing and less attracted to host countries with high 
political risk.  
Hypothesis 3a: Chinese Central SOEs will be attracted to political risk across all 
years of the study. 
Hypothesis 3b: China’s Other Firms will not be attracted to political risk after 2004.  
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Data and Model: 
 The sample for this study is based on a firm-level dataset downloaded from the 
Chinese government’s Department of Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation 
website located at http://fec.mofcom.gov.cn/. This dataset contains 41,716 approved 
overseas investments made to 192 countries by Chinese firms between 1983 and 2015, 
and it contains valuable information including the destination country, name of the 
Chinese investor, name of the affiliate firm or branch, function of each affiliate firm, 
regional origin of each investor, and approval date of OFDI. The regional origin of each 
investor is also classified into 31 different provinces or economic zones, 5 cities, and 
Central State-Owned Enterprises (中央企业 in Chinese). 
The inspiration for using this dataset largely came from analysis of a study 
conducted by Marukawa et al. (2014) of the University of Tokyo which used the same 
dataset to, “clarify the reality of China’s OFDI on the basis of official approval 
information.” (Marukawa et al., 2014). Publicly available data on Chinese investments is 
very limited, and while the Chinese government releases an annual “Statistical Bulletin of 
Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” the data made available in these Bulletins 
concentrates more on overarching industrial and global trends than on country-level 
statistics. Like the study conducted by Marukawa et al. (2014), this study utilizes 
statistics from China’s Department of Outward Investment and Economic Cooperation 
which go further into detail regarding each investment’s target country, the name of the 
investor, the name of the subsidiary, and why each investment was made. This data 
provides a clearer picture about the nature of Chinese OFDI. Additionally, this data spans 
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from 1983 to 2015 which goes from when Chinese OFDI began to almost current day. 
Other studies analyzing political risk’s relationship with Chinese OFDI do not use data 
with such a long time period; therefore, this data could more accurately portray the 
overall investment behaviors of Chinese firms. 
 
Dependent Variables 
Using the firm-level data included in this dataset, two country-level dependent 
variables were created for analysis. First, the total number of investments made into each 
country for each year was compiled from 1996 to 2015. Although the investments from 
1983 to 1995 were not included in the analysis, these investments account for 
approximately 0.2% of the dataset’s total investments and therefore do not have a 
significant impact on the analysis.  
This new country-level data represents the total amount of Chinese OFDI into a 
given country for each year. Then, this total OFDI was separated into two categories 
based on regional origin of the investor: OFDI by Central State-Owned Enterprises and 
OFDI by all other firms. These represent the amount of OFDI by Central SOEs and the 
amount of OFDI by all other firms into a given country for each year. These two 
variables, CentralOFDI and OtherOFDI, serve as the dependent variables in the analysis. 
 
Independent Variables 
The study includes several host country independent variables that influence FDI 
location choice by global and Chinese firms. Host country market size and distance are 
two factors that are widely recognized in economic literature to influence FDI 
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(Chakrabarti, 2001; Mascarenhas, 1992). Host country real GDP is used in this study to 
control for market size, and distance is measured by distance in kilometers between 
China’s capital of Beijing and each host country’s capital (Real GDP and Distance in 
Table 2, respectively). Membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) is also used to delineate between developed and developing 
countries (OECD_dummy in Table 2). Moreover, Chinese OFDI is often directed 
towards the acquisition of information and knowledge such as advanced technology or 
intellectual property (Buckley et al., 2007). Host country technological innovation is 
represented by the number of total patent applications in the host country (Patents). 
Based on previous studies (Ramasamy et al., 2012), host country political risk 
was represented by the World Bank’s Governance Indicators which consist of six 
different measures of host country political risk: Voice and Accountability, Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. These six aggregate indicators are 
based on 31 underlying data sources reporting the perceptions of governance of a large 
number of survey respondents and expert assessments worldwide (Kaufmann et al., 2010). 
All six indicators denote values from approximately -2.5 to 2.5 for each country annually 
where low values represent weak government performance and high values represent 
strong government performance. Due to the highly correlative relationships between 
these six indicators, the Rule of Law indicator was selected as the measure of political 
risk in this study to avoid problems of heterogeneity in the results (PolRisk). 
Host country natural resource endowment has also been shown to have a 
significant influence on Chinese OFDI location choice (Buckley et al., 2007; Quer et al., 
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2011; Ramasamy et al., 2012); therefore, host country ore and metal exports (% of total 
merchandise exports) are used to proxy host country natural resource endowment 
(OreExports). Additionally, political risk and ore and metal exports have been found to 
have a significant interaction (Kolstad and Wiig, 2012; Ramasamy et al., 2012). A similar 
interaction variable is used between political risk and ore and metal exports as used in 
their study, labeled as OreRiskInteraction. 
Many host country economic factors have also been shown to influence Chinese 
OFDI determinants. Volatile and unpredictable inflation rates in host countries, 
“discourages market-seeking FDI by creating uncertainty and by making long-term 
corporate planning problematic…” (Buckley et al., 2007). Host country annual inflation 
rate (Inflation in Table 2) is used to account for the effect of inflation on FDI location 
choice. “As home country exchange rate appreciates, more profitable opportunities for 
outward FDI occur since foreign currency denominated assets become cheaper.” 
(Buckley et al., 2007). Using host country annual change in exchange rate, this is 
accounted for in the analysis. Another economic indicator that can influence OFDI is 
current account balance as it reflects the likelihood of a country to be approaching a 
financial crisis (Current Account). For current account balance, negative values denote a 
current account deficit and positive values denote current account surplus, and when a 
country’s current account balance reaches approximately -5 percent, it is indicative of an 
approaching financial crisis in that country (Croke et al., 2005; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 
2005).  
Finally, in order to test the difference between Chinese firms’ OFDI determinants 
before 2004 and those spanning all years in the study, Pre2004_dummy is included as an 
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independent variable. The other independent variables listed in Table 2 are also 
multiplied by Pre2004_dummy to create new interaction variables. These new variables 
indicated in Table 2 by Pre2004* “x” include: Pre2004_RealGDP, Pre2004_Distance, 
Pre2004_Inflation, Pre2004_Patents, Pre2004_PolRisk, Pre2004_OECD, 
Pre2004_OreAndMetal, Pre2004_OreRiskInt, Pre2004_CurrentAccount, and 
Pre2004_ExRateChange. By including these 10 interaction variables, the effects on 
Chinese firms’ OFDI before 2004 can also be seen. 
 
Table 2: List of Variables and Sources 
Variables Description Source 
CentralOFDI Count of Central SOE OFDI China’s Ministry of Commerce 
OtherOFDI Count of Other Firm OFDI China’s Ministry of Commerce 
RealGDP Host country’s Real GDP (US$, 
constant) 
World Bank Development 
Indicator 
Distance Distance between China’s capital 
and the host country’s capital 
CEPII 
Inflation Host country’s rate of inflation 
(annual %) 
World Bank Development 
Indicator 
Patents Host country’s total patent 
applications 
World Intellectual Property 
Association 
OECD_dummy Dummy variable coded as OECD 
member = 1, non-OECD member 
= 0 
World Bank’s Governance 
Indicators 
Pre2004_dummy Dummy variable coded as OFDI 
before 2004 = 1, after 2004 = 0 
 
PolRisk Rule of Law- A measure of the 
political stability of host country 
World Bank’s World Governance 
Indicators 
OreAndMetal Host country’s ore and metal 
exports (% of total merchandise 
exports) 
World Bank Development 
Indicator 
OreRiskInt Interaction variable of 
“OreExports” and “PolRisk” 
World Bank Development 
Indicators 
CurrentAccount All transactions other than those 
in financial and capital items (% 
of GDP) 
IMF World Economic Outlook 
ExRateChange Host country’s percent annual 
change in exchange rate 
World Bank Development 
Indicator 
Pre2004 * “x” Represents the interaction 
between “Pre2004_dummy” and 
each of the independent variables 
listed above 
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Descriptive Statistics: 
Table 3 depicts the descriptive statistics of each independent variable used in the 
study including the number of occurrences (N), minimum value (Min), maximum value 
(Max), average of all of the values (Mean), and standard deviation (Std. Dev.). 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
RealGDP 3112 2.801 
E8 
2.533 
E13 
3.572 
E11 
1.3822 
E12 
Distance 3720 809.5 19297.5 8970.5 3858.61 
Inflation 3126 -35.8 24411.0 18.496 444.14 
Patents 2072 1 589410 13007.3 57393.5 
OECD_dummy 3838 0 1 .17 .373 
PolRisk 3006 -2.40 2.12 -.0288 .98530 
OreAndMetal 2842 0 86.42 8.33 14.428 
OreRiskInt 2339 -101.1 98.22 .3146 13.702 
CurrentAccount 3473 -112.9 51.11 -2.52 11.078 
ExRateChange 2985 -0.32 694043.8 234.93 12703.8 
Pre2004_dummy 3920 0 1 .40 .490 
Pre2004_RealGDP 3532 0 2.53 E13 1.22 E11 8.61 E11 
Pre2004_Distance 3840 0 19297.5 3476.1 4987.34 
Pre2004_Inflation 3568 -16.12 4145.1 5.7835 74.8068 
Pre2004_Patents 3139 0 440248 2952.3 25904.4 
Pre2004_PolRisk 3228 -2.23 1.97 -.0080 .51533 
Pre2004_OECD 3888 0 1 .0628 .24256 
Pre2004_OreAndMet
al 
3473 0 78.40 2.3693 8.36893 
Pre2004_OreRiskInt 3030 -75.12 75.87 -.0489 5.38238 
Pre2004_CurrentAcco
unt 
3713 -112.93 49.98 -1.058 6.24004 
Pre2004_ExRateChan
ge 
3688 -0.28 6882.2 2.0132 116.46 
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 A few interesting conclusions and outliers can be determined from the descriptive 
statistics. First, based on the mean of OECD_dummy, only 17 percent of countries from 
1996 to 2015 classify as OECD countries, but the mean of Pre2004_OECD shows that 
before 2004 only 6.28 percent of countries were OECD members. Second, the maximum 
value for Inflation is 24,411 percent inflation and the maximum value for Exchange Rate 
Change shows an annual currency depreciation of 694,043 percent. Both of these 
extremely high values stem from the data for Zimbabwe in 2007 who experienced a 
severe currency crisis in that same year that brought about unforeseen inflation and 
exchange rate depreciation. Finally, the minimum value of Current Account Balance is a 
very low -112.9 percent and the maximum value is a very high 51.11 percent. This 
minimum value comes from Equatorial Guinea in 1996 which suffered economically 
until the discovery and exploitation of oil fields in the late 1990’s that propped up its 
economy. The maximum value is that of Libya in 2006 whose oil-dominated economy 
allowed for it to maintain such a high current account surplus.  
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Model: Negative binomial regression 
Since the dependent variables in this analysis are the number of approved Chinese 
overseas investments per country per year, the data is classified as count data, and a 
widely-used model for analyzing count data is the negative binomial regression model. 
The economic theory behind negative binomial regressions is based on data that 
follows a “Poison distribution.” A random variable Y is said to have a “Poison 
distribution” with parameter µ if it can take the values 0, 1, 2,… with probabilities of the 
following expression 
Pr Y = y = 𝑒!!𝜇!𝑦! ,𝑦 = 0, 1, 2,… 
where µ is the observable expected (mean) rate of occurrences and the first two moments 
are  𝐸[𝑌] = 𝜇 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑌] = 𝜇 
It can be seen above that a critical assumption of Poisson distributions is that the 
mean and the variation of the distribution are equal, or E[Y] = V[Y] = µ (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2007). Negative binomial models also specifically assume that the parameter µ is 
random, rather than being totally determined by a set of x variables. In such cases, the 
first two moments of a negative binomial distribution are instead 𝐸 𝑌|𝜇,𝛼 = 𝜇 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑌|𝜇,𝛼] = 𝜇(1+ 𝛼𝜇) 
where α denotes the function of non-observable heterogeneity in the count data. 
Therefore, the variance exceeds the mean in a negative binomial distribution since α > 0 
and µ > 0 (Cameron and Trivedi, 2007). In this way, the negative binomial model serves 
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as an effective model for analyzing how variables can influence count data that is 
affected by overdispursion and unknown, unobservable factors. 
 Understanding the economic theory behind the negative binomial regression 
model, it was determined that this model was best suited for conducting the analysis in 
this study. Due to large variance in the data, the data is overdispersed. Overdispursion 
occurs when a data set has greater variability than normally expected in a given model. In 
the data used in this study, this likely occurs since certain countries such as Hong Kong 
and the United States receive greatly more OFDI projects from Chinese firms than most 
other countries. This creates the existence of outliers in the data that can skew the results 
of the regression. Recall that negative binomial models are specifically designed to 
account for count data than is overdispersed; therefore, a negative binomial regression is 
used for the analysis in this study. 
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Results and Discussion: 
Table 4a shows the results of the negative binomial regression without the 
Pre2004 interaction variables included.  
 
Table 4a: Original Results 
Variables	 (1)	Central	SOE	 (2)	Other	Firms	
β	 Std.	Error	 Exp(B)	 β	 Std.	Error	 Exp(B)	
Intercept	 .006 .1693 1.006 3.029*** .1296 20.68 
RealGDP	 3.975    
E-13*** 
5.3040 
E-14 
1.000 7.115    
E-13*** 
5.898      
E-14 
1.000 
Distance	 .000*** 1.1894 
E-5 
1.000 .000*** 8.873 
E-6 
1.000 
Inflation	 -.040*** .0088 .960 -.036*** .0073 .964 
Patents	 -3.404    
E-6** 
1.2705 
E-6 
1.000 -4.185   
E-6*** 
1.004 
E-6 
1.000 
PolRisk	 .085 .0632 1.089 .146** .0492 1.157 
OECD_dummy	 1.226*** .1323 3.408 .632*** .0988 1.882 
OreAndMetal	 .026*** .0029 1.026 .033*** .0026 1.034 
OreRiskInt	 .026*** .0035 1.026 .039*** .0036 1.040 
CurrentAccount	 .007 .0048 1.007 .015*** .0041 1.015 
ExRateChange	 2.870*** .3892 17.63 2.358*** .2841 10.57 
Dependent Variables: (1) Central SOE OFDI, (2) Other Firms OFDI- Sum of Local SOE and Private OFDI 
 
ϕ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Control Variables: 
Of the control variables found to be significant in the original results shown in 
Table 4a, many confirm the findings of previous studies on Chinese OFDI. Host country 
Real GDP and distance from China are found to be significant for both types of firms at 
the 1% level. This is consistent with standard economic gravity theories regarding market 
size and distance which state that the larger a country’s market size and the closer a 
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country is to the investor, the more likely that investor is willing to invest in that country 
(Chakrabarti, 2001). This potentially explains the phenomenon observed in Table 1 
where from 2003 to 2008 the majority of Chinese OFDI was made into countries in Asia. 
The distance between China and other Asian countries is comparatively small and many 
of them have large market sizes such as Japan and Hong Kong; therefore, Chinese 
multinational firms would be very attracted to investing in Asia.  
Total patent applications (Patents in Table 4a) is also found to be significant for 
both types of Chinese firms. Previous studies have claimed that Chinese firms could be 
attracted to investing in countries that are more technologically innovative and developed 
than China itself (Ramasamy et al., 2012). Many global firms invest in countries with 
better technologies than those domestically available to learn from foreign firms and 
bring that more advanced technology back to their home country (Griffin and Pustay, 
2015). This is especially important in today’s technologically advanced world where 
advanced machinery can greatly reduce the total cost and required labor for a firm to 
create its products. The number of total patent applications is often used to represent the 
level of a country’s technological innovation, and the results in Table 4a show that 
technological innovation is significant in determining FDI location choice for both 
Chinese Central SOEs and Other firms. However, the coefficient for both variables is 
very small, meaning that while it is significant, technological innovation does not have a 
substantial influence on Chinese firms in choosing investment locations. 
Host country natural resource endowment (OreAndMetal) is also found to be 
significant and positive for both types of firms, supporting theories that Chinese OFDI is 
attracted to countries with access to abundant natural resources (Buckley et al., 2007; 
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Ramasamy et al., 2012). In recent years, there has been increasing amounts of research 
dedicated to understanding Chinese OFDI in Africa as well as in other developing 
countries, and one of the central points brought up by these researchers to explain this 
phenomenon is that African countries export relatively large quantities of natural 
resources (Teunissen and Akkerman, 2006). The strong relationship between Chinese 
OFDI and natural resources is supported by the results, and this could help explain 
Chinese firms’ relative interest in investing in Africa. 
Some studies have also found that in addition to being attracted to countries 
which export many natural resources, Chinese firms are also attracted to countries that 
both endowed with natural resources and politically risky (Ramasamy et al., 2012; 
Kolstad and Wiig, 2010). These studies claim that the higher the level of political risk is 
in a country, the more likely Chinese OFDI is being attracted due to the natural resources 
in that country (Kolstad and Wiig, 2010). This study also tests for such with the 
interaction variable between natural resource endowment and political risk 
(OreRiskInteraction). This variable is significant and positive for both types of firms, 
supporting the results of these past studies which found that Chinese OFDI is attracted to 
countries that are both endowed with natural resources and have high levels political risk. 
With regards to Chinese OFDI’s relationship with approaching financial crises, 
the results confirm previous studies and conventional wisdom. Current account balance 
(CurrentAccount) is used to measure a country’s likelihood of approaching financial 
crisis where negative values indicate approach towards financial crises. Countries 
approaching financial crises would not seem to be attractive locations for FDI since, in 
the event of a financial crisis occurring, the value of the firm’s foreign assets in that 
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country could depreciate significantly. Table 4b shows that current account balance is a 
significant determinant of OFDI for both types of Chinese firms, and the values are 
positive both before and after 2004. This indicates that Chinese firms are attracted to 
countries with a current account surplus, not ones with current account deficits and those 
likely to approach a financial crisis.  
Other results in Tables 4a and 4b also show some control variables that do not 
support the findings of previous studies on Chinese OFDI. Inflation for both types of 
firms is significant and negative in the results spanning all years in the study (Inflation). 
This shows that as host country inflation increases, Chinese OFDI into that country 
generally decreases. These results are consistent with standard economic theory that as 
inflation rates become volatile and unpredictable host country FDI is more likely to 
decrease (Buckley et al., 2007). However, inflation before 2004 shown in Table 4b 
(Pre2004_Inflation) is not found to be significant for either type of Chinese firm. This 
implies that inflation rates were not a significant determinant in Chinese firms’ 
investments prior to 2004. 
Another variable that contradicts past literature is the annual change in exchange 
rate (ExchangeRateChange). Central SOEs and Other Firms are both significantly and 
positively affected by annual changes in exchange rate from 1996 to 2016. This shows 
that as a country’s currency appreciates, Chinese firms are generally more likely to invest 
in that country, and this result contradicts the findings of previous studies (Buckley et al., 
2007). On the other hand, annual exchange rate change before 2004 
(Pre2004_ExchangeRateChange) for both types of firms is significant and negative. This  
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Table 4b: Pre2004 Interaction Results 
Variables	 (1)	Central	SOE	 (2)	Other	Firms	
β	 Std.	Error	 Exp(B)	 β	 Std.	Error	 Exp(B)	
Intercept	 -.892 1.847 .410 -1.219 .5116 .295 
RealGDP	 4.114             
E-13*** 
5.9553 
E-14 
1.000 6.897  E-
130*** 
6.476 
E-14 
1.000 
Distance	 .000*** 1.286
0 E-5 
1.000 .000*** 9.773 
E-6 
1.000 
Inflation	 -.048*** .0114 .953 -.021* .0097 .979 
Patents	 -4.127 
E-6** 
1.4099 
E-6 
1.000 -4.721     
E-6*** 
1.125 
E-6 
1.000 
PolRisk	 .104 .0699 1.110 .223*** .0549 1.250 
OECD_dummy	 1.189*** .1418 3.283 .581*** .1112 1.788 
OreAndMetal	 .021*** .0031 1.022 .027*** .0028 1.028 
OreRiskInt	 .021*** .0036 1.022 .031*** .0036 1.032 
CurrentAccount	 .009ϕ .0051 1.009 .016*** .0046 1.016 
ExRateChange	 4.488*** .4789 88.926 3.49*** .3552 32.92 
Pre2004_dumm
y	
-.419 .9421 .658 4.88*** .3284 131.73 
Pre2004_RealG
DP	
8.276 
E-13* 
3.3201 
E-13 
1.000 -5.058     
E-13*** 
1.069 
E-13 
1.000 
Pre2004_Distan
ce	
-.001*** .0003 .999 .000*** 3.781 
E-5 
1.000 
Pre2004_Inflati
on	
.069 .0775 1.071 -.015 .0246 .986 
Pre2004_Patent
s	
-8.961 
E-6 
9.0145 
E-6 
1.000 7.839      
E-6** 
2.562 
E-6 
1.000 
Pre2004_PolRis
k	
-.213 .5832 .808 -.396* .2105 .673 
Pre2004_OECD	 1.683 1.8346 5.380 -.337 .4293 .714 
Pre2004_OreAn
dMetal	
-.055 .0460 .947 -.003 .0145 .997 
Pre2004_OreRis
kInt	
.016 .1322 1.016 .009 .0228 1.009 
Pre2004_Curren
tAccount	
-.043 .0446 .958 .037* .0182 1.038 
Pre2004_ExRat
eChange	
-22.84** 7.5379 1.203 
E-10 
-3.19*** .5886 .041 
Dependent Variables: (1) Central SOE OFDI, (2) Other Firms OFDI- Sum of Local SOE and Private OFDI 
 
ϕ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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suggests that before 2004 both types of Chinese firms were attracted to depreciation in 
host country exchange rate. 
Chinese firms’ indifference to inflation and attraction to currency depreciation 
before 2004 could be the result of Chinese firms seeking to acquire cheap foreign assets 
in countries with currency depreciation. High inflation rates often lead to currency 
depreciation which subsequently causes the cost of production, wages, and assets in that 
country to decrease relative to foreign currency. This is consistent with results of past 
studies on OFDI that show that as host country exchange rate depreciates, “more 
profitable opportunities for OFDI occur since foreign currency denominated assets 
become cheaper.” (Buckley et al., 2007). Chinese multinational firms before 2004 could 
have seen opportunities to cheaply enter new markets due to foreign currency 
depreciation and influenced the location choice of their OFDI.  
 
Political Risk: 
While the results both support and oppose the findings of many past studies, in 
analyzing Chinese OFDI’s relationship to political risk, the empirical results yield mixed 
outcomes. The original results in Table 3a show that political risk (PolRisk) for Central 
SOE’s is not significant, but Other Firms’ political risk is significant and positive. This 
positive value indicates that the OFDI from China’s Other Firms is actually attracted to 
countries with low political risk, not supporting the claims of many previous studies 
(Buckley et al., 2007; Cui & Jiang, 2009; Kolstad & Wiig, 2009; Ramasamy et al., 2012, 
Quer et al., 2012). In fact, according to the results, a one unit decrease in host country 
political risk is associated with approximately a 16% increased chance in the likelihood 
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of a Local SOE or Private firm investing there. Therefore, these empirical results do not 
support Hypothesis 1, which claims that Chinese firms are attracted to political risk. 
However, when the Pre2004 interaction variables are also factored into the model, 
the effect that political risk has on Chinese OFDI is complicated. Table 3b depicts the 
results of the model that includes the Pre2004 interaction variables. The results in Table 
3b show that for Central SOEs before 2004, political risk (Pre2004_PolRisk) is not 
significant in determining where Central SOEs engage in FDI. Therefore, the results do 
not support Hypothesis 3a which claims that China’s Central SOEs are attracted to 
political risk across all years of the study. For Other Firms, on the other hand, political 
risk before 2004 is significant and negative. This shows that before 2004 Local SOEs and 
Private firms were attracted to investing in countries with high political risk, but when 
looking at the years 1996 to 2015 as a whole, these firms display the opposite behavior, 
actually being attracted to countries with low political risk. This suggests that China’s 
Local SOEs and Private firms’ attention to political risk significantly changed after 2004, 
and they changed from being attracted to political risk to being deterred by it. These 
results support Hypothesis 3b that China’s Other Firms are not attracted to political risk 
after 2004. 
Several explanations can be found for China’s Other Firms’ change from 
attraction to political risk to deterrence from it. First, the increased implementation of 
China’s “走出去” or “Go Global” domestic policy helped begin a rapid increase in 
Chinese OFDI after 2003 that was coupled with increased Chinese firm privatization. 
Recall that previous studies have found that China’s Private firms are more market-
seeking than its state-owned firms (Ramasamy et al., 2012); therefore, an increase in the 
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number of private multinational firms as a proportion of total Chinese multinationals 
would likely cause the overall trend of Chinese investment to become more market-
seeking and deter from investments into politically risky countries.  
Second, Chinese firms appear to be turning to more developed countries for 
investment rather than continuing to invest in developing and likely politically riskier 
countries. Membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD_dummy) is used in this analysis as a proxy for classification as a developed or 
developing country, and for both Central SOEs and Other Firms, OECD membership was 
significant and positive from 1996 to 2015. This shows that both types of Chinese firms 
are generally attracted to investing in developed countries. However, OECD membership 
before 2004 (Pre2004_OECD) for both types of firms is not significant. This implies that 
before 2004 a country’s status as developed or developing did not have a significant 
effect on where Chinese firms chose to engage in OFDI. Moreover, previous studies have 
found that the bulk of Chinese FDI has historically been engaged in developing countries 
that, as a group, record higher levels of political risk (Buckley et al., 2007). This study’s 
data supports this claim, showing that the mean value for political risk for OECD 
countries is 1.266 while the mean value for non-OECD countries is -.3192 where higher 
values denote less political risk. Based on this data, it can be seen that as Chinese firms 
become more attracted to investing in developed countries, they would similarly become 
more attracted to investing in less risky host countries. 
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Figure 4: Average Annual Amount of OFDI by Other Firms 
 
 
Another interesting conclusion that can be derived from the results is that recent 
changes to China’s overall business environment seem to affect the investments of 
China’s Local SOE and Private firms more than those of firms directly controlled by the 
central government. Figure 4 shows the average amount of OFDI projects engaged by 
China’s Other Firms annually, and it shows that after 2004 significantly more OFDI by 
China’s Other Firms went to developed countries than to developing countries and this 
trend even persisting until 2015. This supports previous findings that China’s Private 
firms are generally more market-seeking and would likely turn to stable countries with 
large markets for investment (Ramasamy et al., 2012).  
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However, when compared to Figure 5, which shows the annual number of OFDI 
projects by Central SOEs, this trend is not shown. Instead, the investment trend by 
Central SOEs into developed and developing countries is almost the same across all years 
of the study. Central SOEs invested in developed and developing countries at about the 
same rate from 1996 to 2015. This indicates that the observed changes to Chinese firms’ 
investment behaviors in the year 2004 apply to China’s Local SOE and Private firms but 
do not apply to Central SOEs. Huge domestic policy changes such as the “Go Global” 
strategy and China’s rise to become one of the largest economies in the world still did not 
influence Central SOEs to invest more in developed countries over this time period.  
 
Figure 5: Average Annual Amount of OFDI by Central SOEs 
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This poses interesting questions regarding why over a period of time where 
Chinese firms and China itself changed so drastically did China’s Central SOEs not 
similarly change. Strict supervision of these firms by the Chinese central government 
could push Central SOEs to support China’s national agendas at the expense of profit. 
For example, China is one of the largest importers of natural resources in the world. With 
such a need for natural resources, the Chinese government could utilize these large firms 
to enable its acquisition of natural resources despite the level of political risk in host 
countries. Figure 6 depicts the levels of political risk in countries where more than 30% 
of exports are ore and metal exports, and of these countries, the vast majority rest to the 
left of center and are considered countries with higher political risk. In pursuit of 
investing in countries with abundant natural resources, the Chinese central government 
could encourage Central SOEs to invest in higher risk countries such as these. 
Figure 6: Political Risk in Natural Resource-Abundant Countries  
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 Moreover, for the natural resource-abundant countries shown in Figure 5, the data 
shows that only 8.5 percent of these countries are OECD members while 91.5 percent are 
not. This could also help explain the phenomenon shown in Figure 5 where Central SOEs 
invested in developed and developing countries at very similar rates from 1996 to 2015. 
Central SOEs could be pushed by the Chinese central government to prioritize the 
acquisition of natural resources, limiting the pool of potential investment targets to those 
dominated by developing countries and those with higher political risk. The results show 
that China’s Other Firms and Central SOE’s OFDI displays different relationships with 
political risk over time, and 2004 marked a significant year in the change from Local 
SOE and Private Firms being attracted to political risk to being deterred by it. 
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Conclusion: 
Chinese investment into other countries has been increasing at an incredible pace 
in recent years, and this is especially true for Chinese outward foreign direct investment. 
As China’s OFDI policy has liberalized and its private sector become larger, it has 
become easier for Chinese firms to engage in OFDI, and the year 2004 served as a critical 
year in this development.  
 Utilizing new data on Chinese OFDI, this study shows that two different stories 
emerge with regards to Chinese firms’ relationship to political risk from 1996 to 2015. 
For China’s Local SOEs and Private firms, limited investment opportunities prior to the 
implementation of the “Go Global” strategy in 2004 likely drove them to invest in 
countries with high political risk. However, after Chinese OFDI policy liberalized, these 
firms began turning to more developed countries for investment and their attraction to 
political risk similarly changed. On the other hand, political risk did not have a significant 
influence on the OFDI of China’s Central SOEs both before 2004 and after. With their 
relatively large size and tight control by the Chinese central government, they are 
expected to follow national economic imperatives and potential political agendas that 
might lead Central SOEs to make investments regardless of the target country’s level of 
political risk.  
 This study also supports and contradicts various aspects of past research on what 
country-level factors influence Chinese OFDI. The results of this study are similar to 
those found by past studies with regards to Chinese OFDI’s relationship with market size, 
distance, technological innovation, and current account balance. Inflation, exchange rate 
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change, and political risk on the other hand do not exhibit results consistent with past 
studies. 
For countries that seek to attract Chinese FDI, this research suggests that targeting 
specific types of Chinese companies would be most effective. Countries with large 
markets, technologically developed economies, and abundant natural resources can 
approach any type of Chinese firm for investment, but countries that suffer from high 
political risk or a looming financial crisis should target Chinese Central SOEs whose 
large size and backing by the state could allow them to take on riskier investments.  
 These findings ultimately reveal that intervention by the Chinese government can 
have an immense influence on the behavior of Chinese firms and the nature of China’s 
business environment. Following OFDI policy liberalization in 2004, China’s Other 
Firms’ view of political risk changed completely while, for the Central SOEs under the 
government’s direct control, political risk was not important and did not become 
important after 2004. The common denominator in both of these relationships is Chinese 
government intervention. In one, the government enacted change indirectly through 
policy and, in the other, through direct control and supervision. Although it is true that 
any government can have huge direct and indirect impacts on the business environment 
in that country, few governments can match the speed at which China has made these 
sweeping changes, doing so only over the span of about two decades. The changes in 
Chinese firms’ relationships with political risk shown in this study are, at their root, a 
testament to the ability of the Chinese government to quickly manage the Chinese 
economy. 
44	
	
China’s OFDI will only continue to grow in the near future, and this could have 
serious implications for China as well as those countries it invests in. Future Chinese FDI 
could help stimulate the economies of many developing countries and also increasingly 
contribute to the markets of more developed economies. Then, in a world with 
increasingly more Chinese intervention in foreign markets, the influence of the Chinese 
government will also similarly extend. Domestic Chinese goals and national policies 
could begin to have indirect influences on the business environments of other countries. 
Globalization has already achieved this to a certain extent in countries such as the United 
States and organizations such as the EU which are already intricately linked to the global 
economy, but China appears to be a rising player in the field of internationalization. 
Chinese firms’ relationship with political risk may change in the future, but those changes 
will likely be guided by the direct and indirect influences of the Chinese central 
government, and as the amount of Chinese OFDI continues to increase, the role that the 
Chinese government’s national policies and imperatives play in the global economy will 
also increase. 
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Appendix 
Host Country List: 192 Countries and Territories, 1983-2015 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Belize 
Benin 
Bermuda 
Bolivia 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
Botswana 
Brazil 
British Virgin Islands 
(UK) 
Brunei 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Cape Verde 
Cayman Islands 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad 
Chile 
Colombia 
Comoros 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic 
Congo, Republic 
Cook Islands 
Costa Rica 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
French Guiana 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Greece 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Hong Kong (PRC) 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Korea, Democratic 
Republic 
Korea, Republic 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyzstan 
Laos 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Macao (PRC) 
Macedonia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Malta 
Marshall Islands 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Micronesia 
Moldova 
Monaco 
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Mongolia 
Montenegro 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Caledonia 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Palau 
Palestine 
Panama 
Papa New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Puerto Rico 
Qatar 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Rwanda 
Saint Lucia 
Samoa 
San Marino 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Serbia 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Somalia 
South Africa 
South Sudan 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Syria 
Taiwan 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
United Kingdom 
United States of 
America 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Western Samoa 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe
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